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MINNESOTA
LAW REVIEW
Journal of the State Bar Association
VOLUME 30 APRIL, 1946 No. 5
AN INQUIRY INTO THE JURIDICAL BASIS FOR
THE NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL.
By Nathan April*
S ITTING IN Nuernberg is a court known to the world as "The
International Military Tribunal" (hereinafter referred to as the
IMT) composed of four members and their alternates, each of whom
has been appointed thereto by the executive authority of one of the
following nations, viz. United States, Russia, France and Great
Britain. At the bar of this court are some 22 individual defendants
and some government controlled organizations. They are being tried
under an indictment charging them with the commission of "Crimes
against Peace, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity." The
specifications of these charges are elaborated in the body of the
indictment; these specifications, from a purely factual standpoint,
amply vindicate the general allegations.
We propose here to examine into:
I. The juridical basis for the existence of the tribunal;
II. The validity of the commission held by the members
of the IMT:
III. The sufficiency of the indictment to charge a juridi-
cally cognizable offense.
I
By WHAT WARRANT DoES THE IMT SIT?
The instrumentality with which we are dealing is called a "Tri-
bunal." In the context of the present world scene etymological dis-
cussions would be mere pedantry. There can be no reasonable doubt
*Member of the bar of New York and of the Supreme Court of the United
States; author of Guide to Federal Appellate Procedure; former Chairman
of Civil Rules Committee, Southern District, New York; member of Bank-
ruptcy Rules Committee, Southern District, New York.
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that in the eyes of those who fashioned it, the term "Tribunal" held
and holds the meaning of the word "Court" and that the proceedings
before this Court are conceived of as a "trial."
Now a "Court," be it a court of civil or criminal jurisdiction,
a court-martial, a military commission or a court of prize, owes its
genesis to some creative act of the State whose authority it purports
to exercise. A court of International Arbitration or International
Justice comes into existence in the same way, excepting that the
basic legislation upon which its jurisdiction is predicated, is enacted
by way of treaty and not by domestic statute. In the United States,
the act of sovereign authority by which a Court is commissioned
varies in the detail of its manifestation, but its expression is es-
sentially the same. In the case of the United States District Court,
for example, the Congress passed an Act which established the
Court. Congress derived its power to do so from the organic law
which we call the Constitution. The Court, qua Court, being now
established, its incumbents are appointed thereto by the President,
who derives that power also from the organic law and from legisla-
tion enacted thereunder. The appointment is confirmed by the
Senate, also pursuant to organic law. Upon such confirmation, a
formal commission issues from the President to the designee, which
commission serves as the badge of the Judge's authority.
Whether a judge is appointed by the Executive or by the ballots
of the electorate, is immaterial to our discussion; in either event,
this designation finds vindication as an authorized expression of the
national will as declared in its legislation. Absent some legislation,
whether basic (constitutional) or secondary (statutory) he just
does not exist as a "Judge"; and this is true of his "Court" as well.
What holds true for us, is true of all nations whose govern-
ments we recognize. No tribunal exercises a' compulsory juris-
diction implicating a legal power to administer sanctions, unless it
has been created under the authority of law and unless its members
have been accredited thereto by some one duly authorized to sign
and deliver the commission. A court not so based and manned may
exercise a de facto authority by force majeure; de jure, it simply
does not exist; the proceedings before it do not and cannot partake
of the character of a "trial."
So we ask, "By what warrant does the IMT sit ?" By what act
of legislation was it established? We know that no Acf of Congress
created the Court; we have heard of no Act of Parliament which
did so; and while we profess no familiarity with the public records
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of the Soviet Union or of the French Republic, we do know that
the ITMT does not look to such records to vindicate its existence.
Then upon what foundation does the IMT profess to rest? The
answer to the question must be found, if anywhere, in the "Agree-
ment" executed in London on the 8th of August, 1945, purportedly
among France, Great Britain, United States and Russia, which
agreement professes to be signed "by their representatives duly
authorized thereto." This agreement provides that there should be
established
"after consultation with the Control Council for Germany, an
International Military Tribunal for the trial of war criminals
whose offenses have no particular geographical location" etc.
The Charter of the Tribunal, annexed to the Agreement, deter-
mines its membership and defines its jurisdiction.
No useful purpose would be served at this time by scrutinizing
the Charters and plotting the reach and scope of the authority
therein delimited to the IMT. For, at the very threshold of our in-
quiry, we are confronted by a challenge to the efficacy of the Agree-
ment as a predicate for the existence of the IMT. We have already
observed that compulsory judicial process derives validity only from
an act of sovereignty; a Court that commands a legal sanction for
its judgments, is not the child of an "Agreement."
But aside from this, our own Constitution recognizes legislative
force in International agreements or conventions, only when they
constitute "Treaties" duly confirmed by the Senate. The Agreement
of London was an Executive affair; it was never ratified by the
Senate; and neither by the Constitution nor by any statute enacted
thereunder is the Executive empowered to create either national or
extra-national courts.
It is not necessary for us to contend, that under our Constitution,
it is impossible for us to participate in the functioning of a treaty-
created international tribunal whose judgments would bind our
government. We presently waive inquiry into the question whether
such a tribunal could exercise a compulsory jurisdiction, civil or
criminal, over our individual citizens. We instinctively repudiate the
suggestion, that if such tribunal could lawfully exercise such criminal
jurisdiction over our own citizens, it could cast any American in
judgment without a trial by a common law jury and without observ-
ance of the basic American canons of due process of law. We have
not explored and do not propose to explore the gamut of juris-
diction which may constitutionally be vested in any treaty-created
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tribunal. For the bald fact is, that the IMT was not created by treaty.
Nor may we be permitted to ignore the defect in the representa-
tive authority of the person who purported to place the signature of
the United States upon the Agreement of August 8. That person
was Mr. Justice Jackson. Judge Jackson apparently never ques-
tioned his own authority; but we do know, that he was not a
minister, ambassador or consul and that his appointment was never
confirmed by the Senate. The Presidential use of personal emissaries
to negotiate strategic arrangements for the conduct of the war, is
one thing; the use of such envoys to arrange for the establishment
of international tribunals, is quite another. It is not the intent of
the Constitution that those who personify the United States abroad,
should be the personal agents of the Executive; they represent the
United States only when their appointment has been confirmed by
the Senate.
But it has been said that there are courts exercising a criminal
jurisdiction under the National flag which do not rest their authority
upon statute. These tribunals bear at least a superficial resemblance
to the IMT. They are known as Courts-Martial and Military Com-
missions. We propose now to examine these.
The Court Martial.
The defendants at the dock in Nuernberg may in a sense, be re-
garded as prisoners of war, even though all of them were not in
the armed services of Germany. May the IMT be regarded as a
General Court Martial?
It happens that the American practice governing the composi-
tion, jurisdiction, procedure and sanctions of a Court Martial has
in fact, been legislated by the Congress in the Articles of War, as
they have been amended from time to time. While it may be that
this legislation is largely a codification of what we might call the
"common law" of armed conflict among civilized nations, it re-
mains true that Courts Martial, whether as a creation of common
military law, or of the statutes, had and have a very distinctly cir-
cumscribed function. And it may be further remarked that the law
of Courts Martial, like the law of Prize or Salvage, has a definitely
international aspect and that in its fundamentals, it is the same in
all civilized countries.
The distinctive feature of a Court Martial, wbether General or
Special, is that it is not a part of the judicial establishment of the
country. Its closest analogue is the administrative tribunal, whose
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findings are advisory to the head of some bureau or department.
The sentence recommended by a Court Martial, even though it be of
death, is the performance of an administrative act; the execution
of the sentence, after approval by the proper commanding officer,
is the execution of an administrative determination. True it is, that
the Court Martial is bound to follow a regulated procedure; it is
bound to hear evidence and to advise only upon record evidence;
but even so, it is an administrative tribunal adopting a form of
juridical procedure for administrative purposes.
Both in its composition and scope of jurisdiction the IMT differs
radically from a General Court Martial. The membership of such
a Court is exclusively that of Commissioned Officers; and it exer-
cises jurisdiction (excepting in certain non-germane cases) ex-
clusively over the members of its own armed forces. The offenses
of which it takes cognizance, are military offenses; that is, offenses
against regulations governing the conduct of its own military
forces. The IMT is not a Court Martial.
The Military Commission.
In essence, the Military Commission is but a variant of the
Court Martial. Its provenance is more obscure than that of the
Court Martial, even thougl it is a comparatively modern develop-
ment. The first recorded occasion in American history of the con-
vening of such a tribunal was in 1847 during our military occupation
of Mexico. By a General Order issued from Military Headquarters,
it was provided that
"Assassination, murder, poisoning, rape, wanton destruction
of churches.., and destruction... of public or private prop-
erty, whether committed by Mexicans or other civilians in
Mexico against individuals of the U. S. military forces ...
should be brought to trial before Military Commissions."
Later another tribunal named the "Council of War," was created
to try offenses against the laws of war. The Council of War fell into
disuse and its functions were thereafter assumed by the Military
Commission.
The Military Commission, like the Court Martial, is an ad-
ministrative tribunal; it takes jurisdiction of offenders charged with
violations of martial law or of regulations of a military government,
or of the laws of war. The parallel between the Court Martial and
the Military Commission is close indeed. A Military Commission
ii constituted by the same general commanding officers as are
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authorized by theArticles of War to convene General Courts Martial.
The Military Commission has invariably been composed of Com-
missioned Officers. There is no statute which so requires; but there
is no statute which governs the composition of Military Com-
missions; and while the existence of the Military Tribunal has been
"recognized" in Congressional legislation, it seems always to have
been upon the implication that the Military Commission is but a
special type of Court Martial. Nor is there anything in the decision
of the Supreme Court in the Yamashita case which points to any
other conclusion.
The Military Commission assumes jurisdiction of an offense,
only when it has been committed within the field of command of
the convening commander. The act charged against the defendant,
must have been committed during the war or during the period of
military occupation. The persons who may become amenable to
the jurisdiction of the Military Commission are
a. Individuals of the enemy's armed forces who have violated
the laws of war.
b. Inhabitants of the enemy's country occupied and held by
the laws of war.
c. Inhabitants of places under martial law.
Is the IMT a Military Commission? Let us first note that it
does not pretend to be such. There was no reason to have named it
the International Military "Tribunal," if it was intended to estab-
lish a genuine Military Commission. Granted that a rose may
smell as sweet regardless of what you call it, it is not likely that
where serious questions of legitimacy were bound to arise, the
sponsors of this instrumentality would have surrendered the ad-
vantages of so respectable a label, had they felt that they could
claim a right to it. The IMT was not convened by the commanding
military officer; it is not composed of Commissioned Officers; it
purports to take cognizance of offenses either wholly unknown in
that forum or far beyond the orbit of its jurisdiction. Nor does it
purport to be an administrative tribunal; it does not recommend a
sentence to any convening Commander. What ever else it may be,
the IMT is not a Military Commission.
We are thus forced to the conclusion that the IMT has no
legitimacy; it was born of no lawful marriage. It was not con-
stituted under the law of the several nations whom it purports to
represent. If the IMT were sitting not in Nuernberg, but in Phil-
adelphia, how would its bailiffs and gaolers make their return to
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the Writ of Habeas Corpus? How would its members respond
to the Writ Quo Warranto?
The Nuernberg locale may save this Tribunal from the im-
pingement of such writs; it cannot shield it from objective scrutiny
into its legitimacy. Least of all can the verdict of history be averted
by such jejune expedients as that to be found in Article Three of
the Charter, which provides
"Neither the Tribunal, its members nor their alternates can be
challenged by the prosecution or by the defendants or their
counsel."
To what purpose was such a provision included in the Charter?
Were those who drafted the Charter fearful that the IMT could
not survive a challenge to its jurisdiction? If they feared no such
result why did they gag the defendants? In what Anglo-American
country is a defendant on trial for his life, debarred from challenging
the jurisdiction of the Court? In what Anglo-American country will
a Court so challenged, refuse to examine the basis of its juris-
diction? How can we talk of a "Trial" unless the Tribunal, before
which the proceedings are being conducted, proceeds as a "Court"?
Is not the right to level a challenge to the jurisdiction as essential
a right, as the right to cross-examine witnesses or to interpose any
other point in law in bar of the prosecution? Because this cloture
is so inexpressibly foolish, it is bound to become terribly mis-
chievous.
II
By WHosE ComidssIoN Do THE MEMBERS OF THE IMT SIT?
Were we to grant that the IMT was duly established, we would
still be required to scrutinize the credentials of those who purport
to be its members.
For obvious reasons, our discussion will not center upon the
American members of the IMT. Mr. Biddle and his alternate
were appointed to the IMT by Mr. Truman, who purported to do
so, in his capacity of President of the United States.
The President derives all his power of appointment from the
Constitution and from the legislation enacted thereunder; and from
no other sources.
By Sec. 2 Art. 2 of the Constitution the President has the
power to "nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate" to "appoint Ambassadors, and other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court and all other officers of the
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United States, &c." Mr. Biddle is obviously neither an Ambas-
sador, Minister of Consul. He is perhaps a Judge; but of no Court
of the United States. Were he any of these, his appointment would
be wholly invalid, seeing that it was not confirmed by the Senate.
On the other hand, if Mr. Biddle is neither a Judge nor an officer
of the United States, Mr. Truman, as President of the United
States, had no power of appointment in the first instance.
Resort to the Agreement of August 8, will prove nothing. Even
if the Agreement had the force of a Treaty, it would not avail. It
is true that the ambit of the treaty-making power has never been
defined. It is nevertheless fairly clear that the constitution of the
United States cannot be amended by Treaty. Life tenure could not
be granted to the President by Treaty; the Writ of Habeas Corpus
and Trial by Jury could not be abolished by Treaty; nor could the
prerogative of the Senate to withhold confirmation of a judicial ap-
pointment be abrogated by Treafy. As a matter of fact, the Agree-
ment of August 8 is wholly silent upon the point; it does not pur--
port to determine how the parties thereto shall proceed to the ap-
pointment of their representatives.
Here again, we are forced to conclude, that the appointment of
Mr. Biddle and his alternate was the private act of an individual
who happened at the time, to be President of the United States.
III
DOES THE INDICTMENT CHARGE A JURIDICALLY
COGNIZABLE OFFENSE?
The indictment embraces four counts. We proceed to examine
these.
Count One -The Common Plan or Conspiracy
Briefly, this is a charge, in the form familiar to those who prac-
tice in our Federal Courts, that the defendants conspired to commit
the offenses charged in Counts TWO, THREE AND FOUR.
Now, "Conspiracy" is a highly technical crime in any event; it
is one of the metaphysical refinements of legalism. Here you make
a crime out of a mental concert, regardless of whether or not the
objective of the concert was ever wholly or even partially accom-
plished. Even though no substantive offense was committed, even
though the conspirators changed or abandoned their purpose, the
"Conspiracy" would, under our statutes, have been committed.
In practice, the conspiracy count has been used as a device to
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charge the speech and conduct of one conspirator upon the others.
The ethics of such a procedure are highly dubious; but with them
we are not presently concerned. For a conspiracy charge is only
as good as the substantive charges that follow it. An agreement
to commit an act which is not a crime is not a criminal conspiracy.
Count Two - Crimes Against Peace
Here perhaps, it would be best to quote verbatim.
"All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a
period of years preceding 8th May, 1945, participated in
the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars of
aggression, which were also wars in violation of interna-
tional treaties, agreements and assurances."
We are not concerned here with the morals of the matter. What
should or can be done to those who launch wars of aggression, is a
problem which, in the sequel, we will not attempt to evade. At the
moment, we are engaged in probing the juridical basis for the
indictment. We submit that, indictments whose issue may be the
execution of the defendants, must charge, not a breach of morals,
but what in a juridical sense, is known as a "crime."
It seems to be the prevalent orthodoxy to posit the existence of
the "natural crime"; of which, murder and robbery are cited as
examples. It is our ungrateful task to point out that the collocation
"natural crime" is juridically meaningless. Even in a theocracy
where the publication of heresy is a "crime" it is such, only because
a theocracy is not only an established creed but a sovereign State
Either every infraction of the mores of a given place or time is a
"crime" or no moral offense is, in ipse, a crime. Juridically speak-
ing, all "crimes" are offenses against some sovereign, partaking of
the nature of lese majeste or treason. Whether it is the King's peace
or the People's peace that is disturbed matters not; in either case,
it is the Sovereign's dominion that is infringed. Absent a sovereign,
as was once the case in Spitzbergen, there can be no "crime."
Just what is it that makes a "crime" of any homicide? Some
moral prescription, perhaps? Hardly. Is accidental homicide a
crime? Sometimes yes and sometimes no. Is the criterion an ethical
one? Certainly not. The degree of negligence which will inject
criminality into an accidental homicide is the creature of law; in
many jurisdictions, of statutory law. Does the existence of pre-
meditation stamp any given homicide as "natural Murder," or as a
crime? Read the Penal Law of the State of New York; under it
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you Will find several instances where premeditated homicide is
"justifiable homicide." Well then, to what must we refer if we
are to ascertain whether any instance of homicide is a crime?
Obvioisly to the law of the place where the homicide was com-
mitted, or which, under some law, is authorized to take cognizance
of it. And in what sense, do we now use the word "law"? Law, in
this sense, is simply the prescription of the sovereign. We repeat:
juridically speaking, the collocation "natural crime" is meaningless.
We do not suggest that there is anything either novel or pro-
found in these observations; they are implicit in every demurrer to
an indictment for insufficiency. What is novel and disturbing is
the naive assurance that-considerations so elementary may be suc-
cessfully by-passed by the sophomoric expedient of labelling them
"legalistic." They are as "legalistic" as the writ of habeas corpus
or trial by jury.
We need not labor the point: We are not engaged in exploring
the philosophy of abstract law. The trial in Nuernberg is not an
adventure in legal dialectics,-it is a grim affair presaging death to
the defendants; it is predicated upon an "indictment" as that word
is understood in the concrete processes of the law. We are here
endeavoring to probe the legal adequacy of that indictment, not its
moral sufficiency. Does the indictment charge any juridically cog-
nizable offense?
Unless the meaning of the word "law" is to be expanded so as
to embrace every postulated consensus of moral and sociological
judgment, so that "law" comes to mean whatever people in general
are supposed to believe is right, there can be no pretense that there
is or ever was any "law" prohibiting the waging of wars of con-
quest. The history of neither of the two great English speaking
democracies is free from such episodes; the moral condemnation
which we now visit upon wars of "aggression" is, in the perspective
of history, but a development of yesterday. That such a development
was bound to come may readily be granted; it may even be con-
ceived that such a development is the necessary antecedent of the
World State, as the only effective means for realizing it.
It has been said that since the ratification of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, all wars of aggression have been "outlawed" (whatever that
word may mean) as to the nations (of which Germany was one)
who were signatories to that treaty. By the Pact of Paris, the con-
tracting States joined in "condemning" resort to war as an instru-
ment of national policy and agreed that they would thereafter re-
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frain from such resort. By a process of unique ratiocination this
-Pact or Contract has been transformed into a "law" ; a process which
for some reason, had never been applied to the scores of treaties of
international friendship and alliance that had preceded it in world
history; notably the Treaty of Versailles, which established the
League of Nations. No verbiage, however melifluous, can serve to
transmute an agreement into a "law" ;-there may be a law which
provides a remedy for the breach of an agreement, but the law is
not the agreement nor is it generated by it. Prior to the Pact of
Paris, the observance of international treaties rested upon the
honor of those who were parties there-to and upon a decent respect
for their military potential-and upon nothing else. The Pact of
Paris did not change the situation one iota; it no more created "law"
than all the treaties that ever preceded it.
Aside from this,.-were the Treaty indeed a "law"--the only
juridical person who could accomplish its violation would be a gov-
ernment that was party to it. Messrs. Goering et al. were not parties
to the Pact of Paris; the German Reich was. There isn't the re-
motest suggestion in the Kellogg-Briand Pact that a breach of it
would constitute a "crime" and there is no reason for believing that
a single nation would have signed the document had such a proviso
been inserted therein. But even if the Pact had embraced such a
provision and even if a Treaty could constitute a "law" the only
defendant at the bar for violation of this law could be Germany
itself.
We are thus forced to conclude that Count Two of the indict-
ment states no juridically cognizable offense. We proceed to Count
Three.
Count Three-War Crimes
Count Three charges the commission of various "war crimes"-
that is, violations of the laws of war.
An examination of the specifications of this count makes it clear
that it would be cognizable before a regularly constituted Military
Commission of Polish, French, Russian, Greek and other nation-
ality; but not before an American or English Military Commission.
These specifications embrace a formidable array of violations of
the laws of war, sufficient in the amplitude and depth of their infamy
to consign those convicted thereof to the hangman's noose a thou-
sand times over.
In saying this, we are not to be construed as recognizing the
application of any "law" in the premises, other than the law of
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force majeure. 'We have already pointed out that a military com-
mission is an instrumentality of the army; it is not a judicial tri-
bunal. The rationale of its jurisdiction is the law of reprisal. The
nations have agreed upon certain Marquis of Queensbury Rules;
the Commander who catches an opposing belligerent hitting below
the belt will decapitate him; but to make sure of the facts he will
have the matter tried before his advisory Military Commission.
The observance of these conventions of war is recognized as a
moral obligation surviving.the destruction of all contractual obliga-
tions (themselves merely moral obligations as. applied to nations)
occasioned by the existence of a state of war; but like all other
merely moral obligations their infraction is not cognizable before
a judicial tribunal.
The difficulty here is that the IMT is not a military commission;
before the IMT the Third Count states no case. We proceed to
Count Four.
Count Four - Crimes Against Humanity
Article 6c of the Charter defines crimes against humanity as
"murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other in-
humane acts committed against any civilian population before or dur-
ing the war, or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the juris-
diction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of any domestic
laws of the country where perpetrated."
What we" have said concerning the sufficiency of Count Two
applies with even greater force to Count Four. In support of Count
Two a Treaty is cited; and while the Treaty is an untenable bastion,
it at least affords some appearance of foundation.
Here we might legitimately close our inquiry. We had em-
barked upon an investigation into the juridical basis for the pro-
ceedings at Nuernberg; and we have travelled the full course of our
projected journey. But it is impossible to dismiss the matter thus.
The defendants in Nuernberg are moral criminals if ever there
were such: we may not evade the problem posed by them. Must
then these vile savages go unwhipt of justice? It there no available
technique for the exaction of retribution from them?
IV
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
We believe we have already adumbrated the possible and per-
missible; we propose now to confront the problem objectively.
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The Use of the Military Commission
The defendants are charged with the most barbarous infractions
of the laws of war. Everyone of these offenses is cognizable by a
regularly constituted Military Commission of the country in which
or against which these offenses were perpetrated. These countries
include France, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Czecho-
slovakia, Jugoslavia, Greece, Poland and Russia. These defendants
and a hundred thousand others are amenable to the jurisdiction of
scores of military commissions that could be set up across the map
of Europe.
Of course, the offenses triable before these commissions would
consist exclusively of violations of the laws of war; that is, of those
charged in Count Three of the indictment. But the gravity of these
offenses is such, that no defendant could sfirvive his conviction
thereof.
In this connection it might be pertinent to note the untenability
of a position that seems to be taken by some officers of our own
army. We have heard it contended that the uniform protects its
wearer from the consequences of any act committed by him under
an order from his superior officer. The laws of war recognize no
such immunity.
An officer or enlisted man who commits a breach of the laws
of war in obedience to the command of his superior incurs liability
of punishment therefor, if he ever becomes the prisoner of the
offended belligerent. Such punishment may range from imprison-
ment to death; for there is no limitation upon the scope of the
sentence committed to the discretion of a military commission-
and to the authority of the commanding officer. It can no longer be
contended that the officer who ordered or condoned the massacre
of American prisoners of war can escape conviction under the laws
of war by pleading superiors' orders. He would have offended
whether he followed orders willingly or reluctantly. It may be con-
ceded that if he had refused to obey he might have been shot for
insubordination; but it has always been known that the military
profession was an extrahazardous occupation.
Nor is there any reason in law or logic to immunize a com-
manding officer from the consequences of his violation of the laws
of war because of his rank. There is no reason for granting an
immunity to a Chief of Staff-which would not be accorded to
a corporal. The situation is simple enough: he who violates the laws
of war, incurs the danger of punishment therefore, if he is caught
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and brought before a properly constituted military commission
functioning within the orbit of its jurisdiction. We did not need
the Yamashita case to teach us this much.
The Use of the Civil Courts of the Various Imiaded Nations
Trespasses which are not military acts, that is-acts performed
during the subsistence of a state of war-and in the prosecution of
military operations, and which constitute infractions of the law of
the place where they were perpetrated, render their actors amenable
to the local penal law. Rape, for instance, is not an act performed
in the prosecution of military operations. Homicide prior to the
establishment of a state of war, is not an act performed during the
subsistence of a state of war.
For all such non-military acts, those who directly perpetrated
them, and those who instigated their perpetration are amenable
to the criminal jurisdiction of the civil courts of the invaded
countries.
Let us examine a case in point.. The attack on Pearl Harbor was
launched prior to the delivery of any declaration of war; that is,
while the United States and Japan were in a state of peace. Over
two thousand persons were designedly killed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Territory
of Hawaii. Those who committed the homicides wore the Japanese
uniform; a circumstance which demonstrably has no bearing on
the case. It will hardly be contended that an English soldier visiting
the United States, could escape conviction of a crime before a
State Court, be the crime that of assault, larceny, rape, or murder,
merely because he was an English soldier. We grant no extra-
territorial immunity to the Japanese soldier any more than to the
English soldier. The men who launched those bombs in Pearl
Harbor, prior to the establishment of a state of war, were just as
guilty of murder as if they wore no uniforms.
This conclusion must become clear enough if we segregate the
attack' from its sequel. Supposing then-no state of war was
thereafter established: how else could these homicides be regarded,
but as murders? But if they were murders at the moment of their
perpetration, no subsequent developments could serve to erase
their criminality. The fact that the perpetration of these murders
with the connivance of the Japanese Government caused us to
issue a declaration of war against Japan can hardly serve as a
condonation of the crimes.
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It is feasible then for a Grand Jury for the Territory of Hawaii
to find an indictment for murder against every soldier and officer
involved in that act of treachery and to bring within the reach of
that indictment every member of the Japanese Government who
was party to the act. The application of the long recognized doctrine
of constructive presence, will serve to fasten jurisdiction upon the
Tokyo instigators of that collosal crime, with the same vise-grip
as if they had been acting as bombers on the planes.
A trial of the military and civil leaders of Japan before a com-
mon law American jury, upon a simple charge of murder would
be an object lesson far transcending in significance, the theatrical-
ities of Nuernberg. It is even more to the point that such a
proceeding would be absolutely impregnable to attack-upon juris-
dictional or other grounds. The United States District Court for
the Territory of Hawaii is a duly constituted court; its presiding
Judge is duly commissioned and murder is an offense against the
law of Hawaii, of which offense that court has jurisdiction.
It happens that the conclusions we may draw from the circum-
stances attendant upon the Pearl Harbor attack, are equally ap-
plicable to the men of Berlin. The Nazi invasions of Poland,
Russia, Norway and their subsequent homicides were not preceded
by the establishment of a state of war. The civil courts of these
countries may therefore take cognizance of the murders ensuant
upon these invasions-extradite the men of Berlin together with
all their coadjutors throughout the German Reich, and try them
for murder in the manner suggested in the case of Pearl Harbor.
The Use of Political Action
If our sole purpose were to enforce a lesson on the amenities
of civilized warfare, we would require resort to nothing further
than the processes outlined in the two preceding sections. But
were we thus to limit the reach of our educational endeavor, we
would be chastising the burglar, not for his burglary, but for the
indelicate speech which accompanied it. For the fact remains, that
had the German Government been most meticulous in the ob-
servance of the laws of war and had the invading Nazi hordes
dispensed wholesale death and destruction in accordance with the
most impecable standards of military conflict, the defendants in
Nuernberg, and a hundred thousand of their assistants, would still
richly merit the hangman's noose. For the real offense against
which the Nuernberg indictment is levelled, is the moral infamy
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of deliberately planning and launching a war against civilization;
which is the charge embodied in Count Two.
Because we have no World-State there can be no world law;
and because there is no world law, there can b6 no world crime.
An act which is not a crime, is not justiciable before a judilal
tribunal. All this we have already seen.
But, because an act is not justiciable, it does not follow that it
must be tolerated regardless of its moral infamy; that it must go
unpunished despite the desolation it has caused. Within that unit
of organized society which we call "State" or "Government" con-
siderations of high public policy require that no individual shall
take the law into his own hands; and that, if perchance the law has
failed to make provision against the perpetration of certain anti-
social acts, that the damaged party bear their incidence rather than
become his own law-giver. But such considerations can have no
relevancy to the international situation. The sixty-odd "sovereigns"
live in a state of international anarchy; nothing binds them other
than some rather faint intimations from the categorical imperative-
plus a lively respect both for the war-potential of their neighbors,
and the aftermath of reprisal. Here, the rule that no one shall
take the law into his own hands is wholly unknown; it is still un-
known, despite the former League Covenant, and the present
Charter of the United Nations.
The only action open to sovereigns inter sese is political action.
True it is that nations in controversy may, through political action,
submit their quarrel to the judgment of a Court of Arbitration.
But here we have nothing to arbitrate. The conditions of the peace
which we shall impose upon Germany are not the sentence of a
judicial forum; they are the expressions of political action. Those
conditions may implicate the confiscation of the means of survival
of an entire population; such confiscation might nevertheless be a
legitimate expression of political action.
It should be obvious that what cannot be compassed juridically
may nevertheless be attained politically. Napoleon was not "tried"
by the Allies; the authority which effected his sequestration in
St. Helena would have been equally competent to effect his execu-
tion. The conclusion is justified, that what saved him from that
fate, -was the espirit de corps of the royalties of Europe. When the
German Reich submitted to unconditional surrender it placed the
very lives of its people at the mercy of the victors; it did not do
so juridically, it did so politically. The Allies are under no moral
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or legal compulsion to "try" the Nazi culprits from whom they
would exact retribution. The moral crime of these men, is not a
fact that requires to be established by the judicial process. Even
in courts, the doctrine of judicial notice is current; and what is
that but a rule which dispenses with proof because of the notoriety
of the fact?
These men are amenable to direct political action. The conditions
of the Peace may legitimately require their imprisonment or their
execution; nay, the conditions for the further continuance of the
armistice may require the same thing. The acceptance of surrender
established no peace; it merely suspended hostilities. No simulacrum
of a "trial" is required to reach our objective; the conscience of
mankind would be better satisfied by the swift execution of all of
these malefactors than by the rhetorical pyrotechnics of Nuernberg.
It is true that the Allies have perhaps unwittingly obstructed
their own path. In the early days of the war there was much ful-
mination against "war criminals" and many were the warnings of
coming "trials" for these offenders. Precisely what a "war criminal"
was, very few people seemed to know, and these were very un-
communicative. Just how a "war criminal" was to be "tried" was
a matter concerning which very few evinced any curiosity; least
of all those who were loudest in their threats. The whole subject
was enveloped in an aura of verbal grandiosity; at some future day,
after the victory had been won, the stage would be set for the
world premiere of the dramatic production to be known as the
"Trial of the War Criminals."
It does not seem to have occurred to these good people that if
adequate retribution was their aim, they were doing their best to
defeat it. Less devotion to the charms of metaphor and more sub-
mission to the discipline of logic, would have disclosed the im-
practicability of the juridical approach. Upon even a moderate
estimate, it must appear that there are at least a 100,000 coadjutors
of the Nazi regime; no one of whom could legitimately escape
hanging. Considering the duration of the proceedings at Nuernberg,
where only 22 defendants are directly involved, just when could
it be reasonably expected to try the last of these 100,000?
It would have conduced to a swifter cleansing of these Augean
stables had there been prompt, vigorous and extensive resort to
all of the three techniques available to the Allies. And from a
purely practical standpoint these legitimate processes of disinfection
would have greatly simplified our problems of military occupation.
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The course actually selected was probably the most ineffectual that
could have been conceived. Doubtless, it was thought to be psycho-
logically the most desirable; a notion that could have been enter-
tained only by those who were wholly unfamiliar with the German
mentality. The German regards the proceedings at Nuernberg,
as merely political action and views the judicial form of the action
as typical Anglo-American hypocrisy. It may be too late to abandon
Nuernberg; it is not yet too late to apply proper processes to the
rest of the "war criminals."
We should like to add a postscript to what has been written.
To what purpose, it may be asked, have we undertaken this ex-
ploration; or, having so undertaken it, to what purpose would we
publicize our findings? As we are all agreed upon the justice of the
probable fate of the defendants, why underline the illegitimacy of
the procedural modus operandi?
We might well answer that the American way knows of no
justification of the means by the end; that we do not condone mob
lynching even though the defendant has been duly convicted of
murder. All the vaunted immunities of our sacred Bill of Rights
are merely rights to the application of a prescribed procedure. But
we can go further. If our desideratum is the exaction of retribu-
tion from those from whom retribution is due, it is obvious that
the path we have chosen is the equivalent of reaching Boston from
New York, by way of San Francisco, Tokyo, Moscow and London.
In the time that has already elapsed since the suspension of hostil-
ities in Europe, at least half of our total task should already have
been accomplished. This protraction is well calculated to diminish
the rigor of purpose which must be maintained if the ultimate ends
of justice are to be served.
Nor -will diatribes against the spirit of "legalism" serve as an
adequate apologia for the IMT. They come with strange grace
from those who resorted to the device of a "conspiracy" count;
they sound a trifle muddled when coming from those who decry
political action upon the ground that such action would not accord
with our spirit of legalism. We might well say, "If you are so con-
cerned about being legalistic, then be legalistic!' And the con-
fusions which the nimble rhetoric of Mr. Jackson has generated
in the minds of some of our more unsophisticated citizens, who,
according to ancient writ, rush in where angels fear to tread, is
only too evident. For instance, Mr. Walter Lippman, that well
known authority upon criminal jurisprudence, opines that murder
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is murder; an impeccable conclusion with which no reasonable per-
sonable person would care to take issue. Following the Jacksonian
formula, he concludes that the killing of Norwegians by the Ger-
mans was murder, because such killing violated the Pact of Paris.
We have already conceded that the killing of these Norwegians
was murder, because the homicides were accomplished while the
two nations were at peace. But assuming that murder was estab-
lished upon the predicate postulated by Mr. Lippman, upon what
juridical basis does the IMT take cognizance of an offense com-
mitted in Norway against the laws of Norway? We feel confident
that Mr. Lippman could not tell us; we suspect that the redoubtable
Mr. Jackson himself might hesitate before attempting to supply
the answer.
The objection to political action is stated by Mr. Lippman to
be that such action would be in the nature of a "Bill of Attainder"
so abhorred by our Constitution. Our admiration for this refresh-
ing exhibition of respect for the Constitution is somewhat damp-
ened, however, by the reflection, that there are some other relevant
Constitutional provisions that seem to have been overlooked at
Nuernberg; as for instance, that the defendant must be tried in
the district where the crime was committed; that he must be tried
by a common-law jury; that he must be confronted by the wit-
nesses testifying against him; and that the crime of which he is
accused must not be invented after the fact.
